State of Crypto 2025 From Speculation to Adoption October 2025
State of Crypto 2025: From speculation to adoption. October market analysis and institutional trends.
Excerpts from the master's thesis “The LUNA-UST Collapse: What Went Wrong?” by Christian Viehof: the introduction and two sections on the collapse in May 2022. Omitted passages are marked […]. Section numbers and cross-references refer to the full thesis.
Stablecoins have emerged as one of the most significant innovations in the digital asset space. By promising a stable value, typically pegged to the US dollar on a 1:1 basis, they serve as the primary medium of exchange, unit of account and settlement layer within the decentralized finance (DeFi) ecosystem. Yet the mechanisms that maintain the peg vary fundamentally and these design choices carry profound implications for their resilience under stress.
To date, TerraUSD (UST) remains the largest attempt at an algorithmic stablecoin: a token designed to hold its dollar peg not through fiat reserves or overcollateralized crypto-assets but through an endogenous mint-and-burn arbitrage mechanism with its sister token LUNA. Arbitrageurs could burn UST to mint one dollar’s worth of newly issued LUNA whenever UST traded below par and vice versa. In theory, this mechanism kept the peg self-stabilizing. In practice, however, it tied the stability of UST to the market’s confidence in LUNA, whose value itself depended largely on the perceived success and adoption of the Terra ecosystem.
Despite a history of failed algorithmic stablecoin experiments (e.g., NuBits, Basis Cash, Iron Finance), Terra attracted extraordinary capital inflows. Central to this growth was the Anchor Protocol, a lending platform offering a deposit yield of approximately 20 percent on UST (Wong, 2022, fn. 2). At its peak in early May 2022, UST reached a market capitalization of approximately $18.5 billion, with roughly two thirds of the supply deposited in Anchor (Liu et al., 2023: 22). Within a single week in May 2022, the entire system collapsed. UST lost its peg and LUNA’s supply hyperinflated because the arbitrage mechanism tried to absorb redemptions through new issuance. Approximately $50 billion in combined market value was destroyed (Liu et al., 2023). The damage did not stop there because the collapse triggered contagion across the entire crypto sector and contributed to the failures of Three Arrows Capital, Celsius and Voyager. The episode became a defining event of the 2022 “crypto winter.”
The collapse was more than an isolated project failure. A growing body of literature, most notably Liu, Makarov and Schoar (2023) and Gorton and Zhang (2024), frames the UST collapse as a classical bank run occurring on a blockchain […]
[…] A design that fails only when attacked is not thereby sound. In Terra’s May 2022 configuration, no attacker was required since any sufficiently visible movement could trigger the coordination that the conditions had prepared. The attack narrative is therefore treated here as a tested and rejected alternative explanation, not as a competing account of equal standing.
The second balance sheet to move was LFG’s. Between May 7 and May 9, TFL and LFG deployed approximately 80,000 BTC plus their stablecoin holdings, purchasing UST to defend the parity (JS Held, 2022), a deployment Liu et al. (2023: 28) value at roughly $2.5 billion.6 In the stylized accounts, the defense is an asset swap across two balance sheets: LFG sells exogenous reserves (BTC) for UST and retires pressure from the market. Its reserve shrinks one-for-one with the UST it absorbs. This is the textbook mechanics of a fixed-exchange-rate defense and it failed for the textbook reason: the arithmetic was public. Market participants could observe, in real time, a reserve of roughly $3 billion confronting a liability stock of $18.5 billion, of which $12 billion sat in a deposit protocol whose entire holder base was yield-motivated. In the language of Bindseil and Winkler, the elasticity of the system’s liquidity provision was bounded by a finite, depreciating reserve. And, critically, its insufficiency was common knowledge.
The contrast with the May 2021 depeg episode (Section 4.1.2) isolates the role of this common knowledge. In May 2021, the rescue was small relative to the rescuer and invisible to the market. The peg’s recovery was therefore read as evidence of intrinsic stability. In May 2022, the defense was conducted in public view against a liability stock far larger than the visible reserve. The identical mechanism, namely reserve sales in defense of a parity, produced opposite outcomes because the credibility condition, not the mechanism, was decisive. A defense that is visibly incapable of covering the claim stock does not reassure holders. It informs them that the remaining capacity is being consumed and thereby accelerates the queue. […]
6 The deployment was accompanied by public reassurance from the system’s leadership, most memorably Do Kwon’s tweet of May 9, 2022: “Deploying more capital - steady lads” (Kwon, 2022). It is cited as a primary document of the defense’s public communication, an exception to this thesis’s practice of paraphrasing social-media statements.
[…]
What followed is commonly narrated as panic. The accounts show it as mechanics. Holders exiting UST below par faced two routes: sell UST at the market discount or redeem through the native swap by burning UST, receiving one dollar’s worth of newly minted LUNA and selling the LUNA. As the discount widened, the swap route dominated. Between May 7 and May 13 users pushed 7.42 billion UST through the native swap, worth $4.65 billion (Liu et al., 2023: 29). Each swap performed, in one transaction, the operation that defines the design’s fragility: it retired one dollar of debt by issuing one dollar of new equity at the current equity price. With the equity price falling, each successive dollar of redemption required more units of LUNA. The supply expanded from under 1 billion on May 11 to 5.89 trillion on May 13 while the price fell from $50 to approximately one millionth of a dollar (Liu et al., 2023: 29). Redemption drove dilution, dilution drove the price and the falling price raised the required issuance of the next redemption. This is the reflexive spiral of Section 2.1, now visible as arithmetic rather than metaphor.
Two further mechanisms completed the destruction and both belong in the accounts. Inside Anchor, the collapse of LUNA’s price triggered mass liquidations of the bLUNA collateral securing the loan book. These liquidations totaled just over one billion dollars between May 7 and May 12, roughly three quarters of that volume in LUNA collateral (The Block, 2022a). The banking layer’s asset side was thus impaired by the same price collapse that was consuming the currency layer’s equity cushion. This is the signature interaction of a dual liquidity crisis: the bank’s assets were claims on the very equity whose destruction the currency run was causing, so neither balance sheet could stabilize while the other deteriorated. And on May 12 and again on May 13, Terra’s validators halted the blockchain: first temporarily, to forestall governance attacks because LUNA’s collapsed market capitalization made voting power cheap, then definitively (CoinDesk, 2022g; The Block, 2022b). In the vocabulary of Diamond and Dybvig, the halts were a suspension of convertibility, the classical remedy that can break a run by removing the advantage of being first in the queue if it is imposed early and credibly. Imposed after the queue has emptied the building, it no longer breaks the run. It merely confirms that the run is over.
UST closed May 13 below $0.20. Anchor’s deposit base had shrunk to under 2 billion and the reserve was gone (Liu et al., 2023: 29). Tables 4.7 to 4.9 record the terminal accounts as Snapshot 4, the last of the four dates set out in Section 3.2.
| Assets | Assets, USD bn | Liabilities | Liabilities, USD bn |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | UST outstanding (face value, trading below $0.20 per unit) | ~11 | |
| Memo: LUNA market cap (equity cushion) | ~0 |
| Assets | Assets, USD bn | Liabilities | Liabilities, USD bn |
|---|---|---|---|
| Residual UST, collateral claims impaired (bLUNA ~0) | <2 | Deposits (aUST) | <2 |
| Assets | Assets, USD bn | Liabilities | Liabilities, USD bn |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reserve exhausted | ~0 | Memo: contingent liability, peg defense | lapsed |
The liability is stated at face value because that is what the system owed: a par claim does not shrink because it trades at a discount. The gap between the face value of roughly $11 billion and a market price below 20 cents is not a valuation choice. It is the measure of the default.
The accounts state the ending exactly. Anchor’s liabilities had run off against assets that were themselves claims on the collapsed system. LFG’s asset side was exhausted. The Terra protocol’s liability stock had been partially retired, paid in equity that redemption itself had rendered worthless, with the residual face value stranded at a fraction of par.
State of Crypto 2025: From speculation to adoption. October market analysis and institutional trends.

The institutional shift: How major financial players are reshaping crypto markets in September 2025.
Crypto market momentum July 2025. Analysis of institutional adoption, regulatory shifts, and market trends.
Bleiben Sie mit Branchen-Einblicken immer einen Schritt voraus. Erhalten Sie Experteneinblicke und Branchen-Updates aus einer anderen Perspektive.
Wählen Sie ein Thema — wir melden uns innerhalb eines Werktags bei Ihnen.
Hinterlassen Sie Ihre Angaben — wir melden uns mit einem passenden Termin.
Marketingmitteilung gemäß Art. 66 Abs. 2 MiCAR. Kryptowerte sind hochriskant. Siehe Risikohinweis.